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Abstract—In a distributed computing system for the master-
worker framework, an erasure code can mitigate the effects of
slow workers, also called stragglers. The distributed computing
system combined with coding is referred to as coded computation.
We introduce a variation of coded computation that protects
the master’s privacy from the workers, which is referred to
as private coded computation. In private coded computation, the
master needs to compute a function of its own dataset and one
of the datasets in a library exclusively shared by the external
workers. After the master recovers the result of the desired
function through coded computation, the workers should not
know which dataset in the library was desired by the master,
which implies that the master’s privacy is protected. We propose
a private coded computation scheme for matrix multiplication,
namely private polynomial codes, based on polynomial codes for
conventional coded computation. As special cases of private
polynomial codes, we propose private one-shot polynomial codes
and private asynchronous polynomial codes. Whereas the private
one-shot polynomial code achieves a lower communication load
from the master to each worker, the private asynchronous
polynomial code achieves faster computation than private one-
shot polynomial codes. In terms of computation time and com-
munication load, we compare private one-shot polynomial codes
and private asynchronous polynomial codes with a conventional
robust private information retrieval scheme which can be directly
applied to coded computation.
Index Terms—coded computation, distributed computing, poly-
nomial codes, private information retrieval
I. INTRODUCTION
In a distributed computing system where a master partitions
a massive computation into smaller sub-computations and dis-
tributes these sub-computations to several workers in order to
reduce the runtime to complete the whole computation, some
slow workers can be bottleneck of the process. These slow
workers are called stragglers and mitigating the effect of these
stragglers is one of the major issues in distributed computing.
Recently, a coding technique was introduced for straggler
mitigation [1]. In [1], for a matrix-vector multiplication, the
matrix is (n, k)-MDS coded and distributed to n workers so
that each encoded matrix is assigned to one worker. Each
worker multiplies the coded submatrix by a vector and returns
the multiplication to the master. After k out of n workers
return their multiplications, the master can decode the whole
computation. Since the computation of the slowest n − k
workers is ignored, at most n− k stragglers can be mitigated.
This kind of approach to distributed computing is referred
to as coded computation. Several follow-up studies of coded
computation were proposed [2]- [4].
In [5], polynomial codes were proposed for matrix multipli-
cation, where the minimum number of workers for the master
to decode the whole computation does not depend on the
number of workers. In [6], a coded computation scheme that
sub-blocks a MDS code into small blocks was proposed. In
this scheme, several small blocks are assigned to each worker.
Each worker processes its assigned blocks sequentially, block-
by-block, and transmits the partial per-block results to the
master. Since the size of each block is small enough for
the stragglers to compute, all of the workers contribute to
the computation, thus reducing the runtime. However, after
processing their assigned blocks, faster workers stop working
and must wait for slower workers to process their blocks.
If these faster workers could continue working throughout
the coded computation process, the runtime would be further
reduced. Let us call a coded computation scheme where
all of the workers continue working until the completion
of the coded computation process by asynchronous coded
computation.
In this paper, we introduce a variation of coded computation
that protects the master’s privacy from the workers, which
is referred to as private coded computation. In the private
coded computation, the master requires distributed computing
on a function f of its own data A and specific data BD
included in a library B, which is exclusively shared by external
workers. For each worker, the master encodes A with an
encoding function gDA , sends encoded data to the worker, and
requests the worker to encode B with an encoding function
gDB and compute a function fW(g
D
A(A), g
D
B (B)). After the
master recovers the result of desired function f(A,BD) from
the computation results of fW returned by the workers, the
workers should not be able to identify that BD is desired
by the master, which would imply that the master’s privacy
is protected. Private coded computation will be explained in
further detail in Section II.
As a motivating example of the private coded computation,
we may consider a user who employs an artificial intelligence
(AI) assistant, e.g. Google Assistant or Siri, with its mobile.
We assume that the user can request a recommendation from
an AI assistant of an item which is included in one of M
categories that the AI assistant can recommend, e.g. movies,
games, restaurants, and so on. We refer to the M categories
as a library B and denote them by {Bk}Mk=1 such that B =
{Bk}Mk=1. We also assume that the user stores its preference
parameter A. When the user requests a recommendation from
the AI assistant of an item in a category BD, the assistant
encodes A and sends encoded data to several distributed
workers, e.g. data centers, for recovering f(A,BD) in a
distributed way. After recovery, the AI assistant can decide the
recommended item based on f(A,BD). We assume that the
user can delete the recommendation service usage record right
after the item is recommended so that the AI assistant does
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2not identify the user’s recommendation service usage pattern.
Generally, the user uses this recommendation service ac-
cording to its life cycle. That is, if the workers track the
recommendation service usage records, the user’s life cycle
is revealed to them, which implies that the user’s privacy has
been invaded. We remark that this privacy invasion on the
user’s life cycle is related to B, not A. That is, encrypting
the user’s preference parameter A cannot protect the user’s
privacy on the life cycle. Therefore, in order to protect the
user’s privacy, the workers should not know that a particular
BD is desired by a user, which motivates the private coded
computation.
In this paper, we propose a private coded computation
scheme for matrix multiplication, based on polynomial codes
in [5]. We refer to this scheme as private polynomial codes. In
order to protect the master’s privacy, the workers are grouped
according to the assigned work in the private polynomial
codes, which is different from the conventional polynomial
codes.
As special cases of private polynomial codes, we pro-
pose private one-shot polynomial codes and private asyn-
chronous polynomial codes. In the private one-shot polynomial
codes, the whole computation is converted into several sub-
computations, and only one sub-computation is assigned to
each worker. Since each worker only computes the sub-
computation once, we call this scheme private one-shot poly-
nomial codes. The computation of stragglers is ignored in
private one-shot polynomial codes. By contrast, in private
asynchronous polynomial codes, the whole computation is
converted into much smaller sub-computations so that even the
stragglers, with their low computational capability, can finish
some sub-computations. In private asynchronous polynomial
codes, several sub-computations are to be computed by each
worker. If assigned enough sub-computations, every worker
within each group can continue working throughout the coded
computation process, which reduces the computation time for
coded computing.
Whereas the private asynchronous polynomial codes achieve
faster computation time, the private one-shot polynomial codes
achieve relatively lower communication load from the master
to the workers. In terms of computation time and communica-
tion load, we compare private one-shot polynomial codes and
private asynchronous polynomial codes with the conventional
optimal robust private information retrieval (RPIR) scheme in
[8]. Note that the RPIR scheme in [8] is directly applicable
for coded computation.
Notation : We use [N ] to denote a set comprised of N
elements, 1 to N . A set comprised of M elements, N + 1 to
N +M is denoted by [N + 1 : N +M ].
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we describe a system model of private coded
computation. There is a master who has its own dataset A,
where A is an element (matrix) in a vector space V1 over
a field F. There are also N external workers {Wi}Ni=1, and
these workers share a library B which consists of M different
datasets {Bk}Mk=1. Each dataset Bk is an element (matrix) in
a vector space V2 over the same field F. The master needs
distributed computing on a function f of A and one of M
datasets {Bk}Mk=1 in library B, where f : (V1,V2) → V3
for a vector space V3 over the same field F. We denote the
desired dataset by BD. Therefore, the whole computation
desired by the master is denoted by f(A,BD). Since we
consider private coded computation for matrix multiplication,
f(A,BD) = ABD in this paper.
The whole computation is converted into several sub-
computations and the master assigns one or more sub-
computations to each worker. We assume that the same
number of sub-computations are assigned to each worker and
that each worker returns each sub-computation result to the
master whenever the worker finishes a sub-computation. When
sufficient number of sub-computation results are returned to
the master, the master can recover the whole computation
f(A,BD) based on the received sub-computation results.
We denote the minimum number of sub-computation results
to recover f(A,BD) by K. If only one sub-computation
is assigned to each worker, the sub-computation results re-
turned by the fastest K workers are enough to recover the
whole computation. That is, the minimum number of sub-
computation results to recover f(A,BD) equals the minimum
number of workers to recover f(A,BD), which was defined
as recovery threshold in [5]. In this case, the slowest N −K
workers become stragglers, since they do not finish their
sub-computations and thus do not contribute to the whole
computation. If several sub-computations are assigned to each
worker, the master can recover f(A,BD) when K sub-
computation results are returned across N workers, including
the computation of slow workers. After the master recovers
the whole computation, each worker should not be able to
identify that BD is desired by the master, thus protecting the
master’s privacy. In this paper, we assume that the workers
do not collude with each other in that each worker does not
know which sub-computations are assigned to, computed by,
and returned by the other workers.
The master’s own dataset A and the library B are encoded
for the private coded computation. Note that the master’s
own dataset A is encoded by the master whereas the library
B is encoded by each worker. The master encodes A for
each worker Wi. We denote the encoding function of A
for the worker Wi and desired matrix BD by gDA,Wi , where
gDA,Wi : V1 → Uδ11 for a vector space U1 over the same field
F. Note that the parameter δ1 is related to the number of
sub-computations assigned to each worker. The master sends
the encoded data gDA,Wi(A) to the worker Wi and also sends
the queries for requesting Wi to encode the library B. We
denote the encoding function of the worker Wi for the library
B = {Bk}Mk=1 and the desired dataset BD by gDB,Wi , where
gDB,Wi : V
M
2 → Uδ22 for a vector space U2 over the same field
F. The parameters δ1 and δ2 are jointly related to the number
of sub-computations assigned to each worker. The master also
sends the queries to the worker Wi to compute a function of
gDA,Wi(A) and g
D
B,Wi(B) and return the computation result of
the function to the master. That is, the worker Wi computes
fDWi(g
D
A,Wi(A), g
D
B,Wi(B)). We denote the function of Wi by
3Fig. 1. The overall process of private coded computation. Using N workers {Wi}Ni=1, a master wants to compute a function f of its own dataset A and
a desired dataset BD in a library B of M datasets {Bk}Mk=1, which is shared by the workers, while the workers do not identify the desired index D. The
master encodes A for each worker Wi with an encoding function gDA,Wi and transmits encoded data C
D
i to Wi. The master also sends the queries Q
D
i to
Wi for requesting Wi to encode B with its encoding function gDB,Wi and to compute a function f
D
Wi
(gDA,Wi (A), g
D
B,Wi
(B)). Each worker Wi sequentially
computes the function fDWi (g
D
A,Wi
(A), gDB,Wi (B)) and returns sub-computation results of f
D
Wi
, RDi , to the master. After receiving K sub-computation results
{Si}Ki=1 from N workers, the master can decode the sub-computation results with decoding function dD to recover f(A,BD). For each Wi, the constraint
for the master’s privacy is given by I(D;QDi , C
D
i , R
D
i ,B) = 0.
fDWi : (U
δ1
1 ,U
δ2
2 )→ Uδ33 for a vector space U3 over the same
field F. Note that the parameter δ3 denotes the number of
sub-computations to be returned by the worker Wi and δ3
is the same across workers. As was previously assumed, if
δ3 is larger than 1, the worker Wi sequentially computes the
function fDWi one by one, and returns each sub-computation
result to the master upon finishing each sub-computation.
Without considering where the sub-computation result comes
from, we denote the ith sub-computation result returned to
the master by Si, where Si is an element in the vector space
U3. After K sub-computation results {Si}Ki=1 across the N
workers are returned to the master, the master can recover
the whole computation f(A,BD) by decoding {Si}Ki=1. If we
denote the decoding function at the master by dD : UK3 → V3,
the decoding function dD should satisfy the constraint given
by dD(S1, S2, · · · , SK) = f(A,BD).
The master’s privacy is protected when none of the workers
can identify index D of the desired dataset BD after the master
recovers the whole computation. Since the privacy we consider
is information-theoretic privacy, the privacy constraint for each
worker Wi can be expressed as
I(D;QDi , g
D
A,Wi(A), f
D
Wi(g
D
A,Wi(A), g
D
B,Wi(B)),B) = 0,
where QDi denotes the queries that the master sends to
the worker Wi for encoding gDB,Wi(B) and computing
fDWi(g
D
A,Wi(A), g
D
B,Wi(B)).
For a simpler expression, we denote gDA,Wi(A) and
fDWi(g
D
A,Wi(A), g
D
B,Wi(B)) by C
D
i and R
D
i , respectively, so
that the privacy constraint becomes
I(D;QDi , C
D
i , R
D
i ,B) = 0. (1)
The overall process of the private coded computation is
depicted in Fig.1.
III. PRIVATE POLYNOMIAL CODES
In this section, we propose private polynomial codes for
matrix multiplication. We describe the scheme with two illus-
trative examples and generally describe the private polynomial
codes. We also show that the master’s privacy is protected.
Finally, we explain certain special cases of private polynomial
codes, which are referred to as private one-shot polynomial
codes and private asynchronous polynomial codes.
A. Illustrative examples
As the first example, we assume that the master has a
matrix A ∈ Fr×sq for sufficiently large finite field Fq and
that there are 12 non-colluding workers {Wn}12n=1 where each
worker has a library of two matrices B1,B2 ∈ Fs×tq . As in
Section II, we denote the library by B. Let us assume that the
master wants to compute AB1 using {Wn}12n=1 while hiding
that the master desires B1 from the workers. The matrix A
can be partitioned into two submatrices A0,A1 ∈ Fr/2×sq
so that A=
[
A0
A1
]
and each of B1,B2 are partitioned into
two submatrices Bk,1,Bk,2 ∈ Fs×t/2q , k ∈ [2] , so that
4Bk=
[
Bk,1 Bk,2
]
. Therefore, AB1 =
[
A0B1,1 A0B1,2
A1B1,1 A1B1,2
]
.
The polynomial codes for A, B1 and B2 are as follows.
A˜(x) = A0 +A1x, B˜k(y) = Bk,1y +Bk,2y
2, (2)
where k ∈ [2] and x, y ∈ Fq denote the variables of
polynomials A˜ and B˜k, respectively.
Note that the master’s own matrix A and the library B
are encoded separately, which differs from the conventional
polynomial codes. We denote the evaluations of A˜ at x = xi
and B˜k at y = yi by A˜(xi) and B˜k(yi) , respectively. For the
desired matrix B1 and each worker Wi, the master evaluates
A˜ at a randomly chosen point xWi and sends the evaluation
A˜(xWi) to the worker Wi. That is, g
1
A,Wi(A) = A˜(xWi). We
assume that the points {xWi}12i=1 are distinct from each other.
Since the master sends only one evaluation A˜(xWi) to each
worker, δ1 = 1 in the encoding function g1A,Wi . The master
also sends the queries Q1i that request Wi to encode the library
B with and encoding function g1B,Wi and compute a function
f1Wi(g
1
A,Wi(A), g
1
B,Wi(B)).
The library B is encoded as follows. Firstly, for evaluating
B˜1, the workers are divided into three equal-sized groups
according to the evaluating points. For simplicity, we assume
that the evaluations points for the desired matrix B˜1 arey = y1
for the workers {Wi}4i=1, y = y2 for the workers {Wi}8i=5,
and y = y3 for the workers {Wi}12i=9, respectively. Note that
the points {yi}3i=1 are randomly chosen in Fq and distinct
from each other. We denote the workers {Wi}4i=1, {Wi}8i=5,
and {Wi}12i=9 by groups G1, G2 and G3, respectively. Since
the workers do not collude with each other, they do not know
that they are grouped according to the evaluating points for
B˜1. Secondly, for all of the workers, the undesired matrix
B˜2 is evaluated at a randomly chosen point y4 which is
distinct from points {yi}3i=1. Since the workers do not collude
with each other, they cannot notice that B˜2 is evaluated
at an identical point y4 across workers. Finally, for each
worker Wi in each group Gt, the encoded library is given
by g1B,Wi(B) = B˜1(yt) + B˜2(y4). Since the desired matrix
B1 is evaluated at only one point for each worker, δ2 = 1 in
the encoding function g1B,Wi .
After encoding the library, each worker Wi in each
group Gt computes a function f1Wi(g
1
A,Wi(A), g
1
B,Wi(B)) =
A˜(xWi)(B˜1(yt)+B˜2(y4)). Since every worker computes only
one sub-computation, δ3 = 1 in the function f1Wi . We can
express the sub-computation A˜(xWi)(B˜1(yt) + B˜2(y4)) as
follows.
A˜(xWi)(B˜1(yt) + B˜2(y4))
= (A0 +A1xWi)(B1,1yt +B1,2y
2
t +B2,1y4 +B2,2y
2
4)
= Zt,0 + Zt,1xWi ,
where Zt,0 and Zt,1 are given by
Zt,0 = A0(B1,1yt +B1,2y
2
t +B2,1y4 +B2,2y
2
4),
Zt,1 = A1(B1,1yt +B1,2y
2
t +B2,1y4 +B2,2y
2
4).
Since the evaluating points yt and y4 are identical across
workers in group Gt, we can write the polynomial of x to be
decoded by the master as A˜(x)(B˜1(yt) + B˜2(y4)) = Zt,0 +
Zt,1x. Since the degree of polynomial A˜(x)(B˜1(yt)+B˜2(y4))
is 1 and the evaluating points {xWi}12i=1 are distinct from each
other, the master can decode the polynomial from the sub-
computation results returned by the two fastest workers in Gt,
by polynomial interpolation with respect to the variable x.
We denote the decoding function by dD and the ith sub-
computation result returned to the master within group Gt by
St,i. The master can decode the each of the three polynomials
{A˜(x)(B˜1(yt) + B˜2(y4))}3t=1 from each set of two sub-
computation results {St,1, St,2}3t=1 returned by each of the
three groups {Gt}3t=1, so that the coefficients {Zt,0,Zt,1}3t=1
are obtained. The coefficients {Zt,0}3t=1 and {Zt,1}3t=1
are evaluations of polynomials (A0B2,1y4 + A0B2,2y24) +
A0B1,1y + A0B1,2y
2 and (A1B2,1y4 + A1B2,2y24) +
A1B1,1y+A1B1,2y
2 at y = {yt}3t=1, respectively. Note that
the terms A0B2,1y4+A0B2,2y24 and A1B2,1y4+A1B2,2y
2
4
are constant terms in each polynomial, respectively. For each
l ∈ [0, 1], the master can decode each polynomial (AlB2,1y4+
AlB2,2y
2
4)+AlB1,1y+AlB1,2y
2 from {Zt,l}3t=1 with poly-
nomial interpolation with respect to y so that the coefficients
{AlB1,i}2i=1 are obtained. After decoding all of the polyno-
mials {(AlB2,1y4 +AlB2,2y24) +AlB1,1y +AlB1,2y2}1l=0,
the whole computation AB1 =
[
A0B1,1 A0B1,2
A1B1,1 A1B1,2
]
can be
recovered from the coefficients {AlB1,i}(1,2)(l,i)=(0,1). Therefore,
the minimum number of sub-computation results to recover the
whole computation AB1, which was denoted by K in Section
II, equals 6 and dD(S1,1, S1,2, S2,1, S2,2, S3,1, S3,2) = AB1.
Note that the master can recover the whole computation AB1
after the slowest group among three groups returns two sub-
computation results, thus implying that the computation time
of the private polynomial code is dependent on the slowest
group.
We now explain the second example. Compared to the
first example, the only difference in the second example is
the number of submatrices of A, where A can be parti-
tioned into 100 submatrices {Ai}99i=0 ∈ Fr/100×sq so that
A =
[
A0
T A1
T · · · AT99
]T
. Note that the size of each
submatrix Ai is 50 times smaller than that of the first example.
Since Bk=
[
Bk,1 Bk,2
]
, the whole computation AB1 which
is desired by the master is given by
AB1 =

A0B1,1 A0B1,2
A1B1,1 A1B1,2
...
...
A99B1,1 A99B1,2
 . (3)
The polynomial codes for A, B1 and B2 are given as
follows.
A˜(x) =
99∑
l=0
Alx
l, B˜k(y) = Bk,1y +Bk,2y
2, (4)
where k ∈ [2] and x, y ∈ Fq denote the variables of
polynomials A˜ and B˜k, respectively.
For the desired matrix B1 and each worker Wi, the master
evaluates A˜ at 100 distinct and randomly chosen points
{xWi,p}100p=1 and sends the evaluations {A˜(xWi,p)}100p=1 to the
5worker Wi. That is, g1A,Wi(A) = {A˜(xWi,p)}100p=1. Since
the master sends 100 evaluations to each worker, δ1 =
100 in the encoding function g1A,Wi . The master also sends
the queries Q1i that request Wi to encode the library B
with and encoding function g1B,Wi and compute a function
f1Wi(g
1
A,Wi(A), g
1
B,Wi(B)). The library B is encoded in the
same way as in the first example. That is, all of 12 workers
are divided into three equal-sized groups according to the
evaluating point for B˜1.
After encoding the library, each worker Wi in each
group Gt computes a function f1Wi(g
1
A,Wi(A), g
1
B,Wi(B)) =
{A˜(xWi,p)(B˜1(yt) + B˜2(y4))}100p=1. Since every worker com-
putes 100 sub-computations, δ3 = 100 in the function f1Wi .
Since δ3 > 1, each worker sequentially computes the function
f1Wi and returns each sub-computation A˜(xWi,p)(B˜1(yt) +
B˜2(y4)) whenever it finishes, as explained in Section II.
We can express each sub-computation A˜(xWi,p)(B˜1(yt) +
B˜2(y4)) as follows.
A˜(xWi,p)(B˜1(yt) + B˜2(y4))
= (
99∑
l=0
Alx
l
Wi,p)(B1,1yt +B1,2y
2
t +B2,1y4 +B2,2y
2
4)
=
99∑
l=0
Zt,lx
l
Wi,p,
where {Zt,l}99l=0 are given by
Zt,l = Al(B1,1yt +B1,2y
2
t +B2,1y4 +B2,2y
2
4), (5)
∀l ∈ [0 : 99].
Since the evaluating points yt and y4 are identical across
the workers in the group Gt, we can write the polyno-
mial of x to be decoded by the master as A˜(x)(B˜1(yt) +
B˜2(y4)) =
∑99
l=0 Zt,lx
l, whose coefficients are {Zt,i}99i=0.
Since the degree of polynomial A˜(x)(B˜1(yt)+ B˜2(y4)) is 99
and the evaluating points {xWi,p}(100,12)(p,i)=(1,1) are distinct from
each other, the master can decode the polynomial from 100
sub-computation results returned by the workers in Gt, by
polynomial interpolation with respect to the variable x.
We denote the decoding function by dD and the ith sub-
computation result returned to the master within group Gt
by St,i. The master can decode each of the three polyno-
mials {A˜(x)(B˜1(yt) + B˜2(y4))}3t=1 from each set of 100
sub-computation results {St,[100]}3t=1 returned by each of
3 groups {Gt}3t=1, so that the coefficients of the polyno-
mials {Zt,[0:99]}3t=1 are obtained. For l ∈ [0 : 99], each
set of coefficients {Zt,l}3t=1 are evaluations of polynomials
(AlB2,1y4+AlB2,2y
2
4)+AlB1,1y+AlB1,2y
2. Note that the
terms {AlB2,1y4 +AlB2,2y24}99l=0 are constant terms in each
polynomial. For each l, the master can decode the polynomial
(AlB2,1y4+AlB2,2y
2
4)+AlB1,1y+AlB1,2y
2 from {Zt,l}3t=1
with polynomial interpolation with respect to y so that the
coefficients {AlB1,i}2i=1 are obtained. After decoding all
of the polynomials {(AlB2,1y4 + AlB2,2y24) + AlB1,1y +
AlB1,2y
2}99l=0, the whole computation AB1 given in (3) can
be recovered from the coefficients {AlB1,i}(99,2)(l,i)=(0,1). There-
fore, K equals 300 and dD(S1,[100], S2,[100], S3,[100]) = AB1.
In the second example, the computational complexity for
each sub-computation A˜(xWi,p)(B˜1(yt)+B˜2(y4)) is 50 times
smaller than that of the sub-computation in the first example,
thus implying that even slow workers may return some sub-
computations to the master. That is, whereas the computations
of slow workers are ignored in the first example, even slow
workers can contribute to overall computation in the second
example by partitioning matrix A into substantially smaller
submatrices. Furthermore, as each worker computes 100 sub-
computation results in the second example, the faster workers
can compute and return more sub-computation results than the
slower workers whereas even the fastest worker may return
one sub-computation result at most in the first example. That
is, in the second example, the faster workers are exploited
more efficiently than in the first example. As a result, the
computation time of the second example is reduced compared
to the first example.
Although the computation time is reduced in the second
example, more communication load for sending the evalua-
tions of A from the master to the workers is required in the
second example. In the first example, the master sends one
evaluation A˜(xWi) ∈ Fr/2×sq to each worker Wi whereas the
master sends 100 evaluations {A˜(xWi,p)}100p=1 to each worker
Wi, where A˜(xWi,p) ∈ Fr/100×sq , in the second example. That
is, twice more communication load from the master to the
workers is required in the second example. As a result, we
can say that there is a trade-off between communication load
and computation time. Considering both communication load
and computation time, the scheme in the first example may
outperform the scheme in the second example if the main
bottleneck of the coded computation process is communication
between the master and the workers.
We intuitively explain how the master’s privacy is protected
in both of the examples. As we assumed, none of the workers
collude with each other, which implies that the worker do not
know about the evaluating points of other workers. Therefore,
evaluating B˜1 with yt in group Gt and B˜2 with y4 across
workers does not hurt the master’s privacy. For each worker
Wi in Gt, we also assumed that the evaluating points yt and
y4 are randomly chosen and distinct from each other, which
implies that Wi cannot identify that the desired matrix is B1 by
the evaluating points yt and y4. For encoding the library, since
all of the encoded elements in the library are symmetrically
summed in to one equation B˜1(yt) + B˜2(y4), encoding the
library does not hurt the master’s privacy. Therefore, each
worker Wi in each group Gt cannot identify that the desired
matrix is B1 throughout the coded computation process, which
implies that the master’s privacy has been protected across
workers.
B. General description
In this section, we generally describe the private polynomial
codes for matrix multiplication. There are N non-colluding
workers {Wn}Nn=1 and each worker has a library B of M
matrices {Bk}Mk=1 where each Bk ∈ Fs×tq for sufficiently
large finite field Fq . The master has a matrix A ∈ Fr×sq and
desires to multiply A by one of {Bk}Mk=1 in the library B
6while keeping the index of desired matrix BD from all of
the workers. Matrix A can be partitioned into m submatrices
{Ak}m−1k=0 ∈ Fr/m×sq and each Bk can be partitioned into n−1
submatrices {Bk,l}n−1l=1 ∈ Fs×t/(n−1)q , where m,n ∈ N+. The
whole computation ABD that the master wants to recover is
given by
ABD =

A0BD,1 A0BD,2 · · · A0BD,n−1
A1BD,1 A1BD,2 · · · A1BD,n−1
...
... · · · ...
Am−1BD,1 Am−1BD,2 · · · Am−1BD,n−1
 .
The polynomial codes for A and {Bk}Mk=1 are given as
follows.
A˜(x) =
m−1∑
l=0
Alx
l, B˜k(y) =
n−1∑
l=1
Bk,ly
l, (6)
where k ∈ [M ] and x, y ∈ Fq for sufficiently large finite field
Fq .
Each sub-computation result to be returned to the master is
in the form of A˜(xp)(B˜D(yq)+
∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(yjk)), for ran-
domly chosen points x = xp, y = yq , and {yjk |k ∈ [M ]\D},
where the points y = yq and {yjk |k ∈ [M ] \D} are distinct
from each other. For given yq , after m sub-computation results
{A˜(xp)(B˜D(yq) +
∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(yjk))}mp=1 are returned to
the master, the master can decode the polynomial given by
A˜(x)(B˜D(yq) +
∑
k∈[M ]\D
B˜k(yjk))
=
m−1∑
l=0
(AlB˜D(yq) +
∑
k∈[M ]\D
AlB˜k(yjk))x
l.
The coefficients of the polynomial {Al(B˜D(yq) +∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(yjk))}m−1l=0 are obtained by polynomial inter-
polation for variable x. After decoding n different polynomials
{A˜(x)(B˜D(yq)+
∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(yjk))}nq=1 for variable x and
obtaining the coefficients of the polynomials {Al(B˜D(yq) +∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(yjk))}(m−1,n)(l,q)=(0,1), the master can decode m dif-
ferent polynomials given by
{Al(B˜D(y) +
∑
k∈[M ]\D
B˜k(yjk))}m−1l=0
= {
n−1∑
r=1
AlBD,ry
r +
∑
k∈[M ]\D
AlB˜k(yjk)}m−1l=0 .
By polynomial interpolation for variable y, the coefficients
of polynomials {AlBD,r}(m−1,n−1)(l,r)=(0,1) are obtained, from which
the whole computation ABD can be recovered. Note that the
terms {∑k∈[M ]\DAlB˜k(yjk)}m−1l=0 are constant terms in each
of the polynomials {Al(B˜D(y) +
∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(yjk))}m−1l=0 .
Therefore, after mn sub-computation results
{A˜(xp)(B˜D(yq) +
∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(yjk))}(m,n)(p,q)=(1,1) are
returned to the master, the master can recover the whole
computation ABD through twofold decoding. That is, the
minimum number (K) of sub-computation results to recover
the whole computation, equals mn in private polynomial
codes.
We denote the number of evaluations of A˜ sent from the
master to each worker Wi by L, where L distinct and randomly
chosen evaluating points for A˜ are given by {xWi,p}Lp=1, and
L evaluations sent to Wi are given by {A˜(xWi,p)}Lp=1. In
Section III-A, L = 1 in the first example whereas L = 100
in the second example. Since the master encodes A with
encoding function gDA,Wi , g
D
A,Wi(A) = {A˜(xWi,p)}Lp=1. The
master sends not only evaluations {A˜(xWi,p)}Lp=1 but also
queries QDi for requesting Wi to encode the library B
with an encoding function gDB,Wi and compute the function
fDWi(g
D
A,Wi(A), g
D
B,Wi(B)).
Whereas L evaluations of A˜ are assigned to Wi, the master
can request each worker Wi to evaluate each {B˜k}Mk=1 at
only one point. This is because M − 1 distinct and ran-
domly chosen evaluating points {yjk |k ∈ [M ] \ D} for
{B˜k|k ∈ [M ] \D} should be identical across the workers so
that the term
∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(yjk) can be constant. Otherwise,
the master cannot decode the polynomials {Al(B˜D(y) +∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(yjk))}m−1l=0 by polynomial interpolation for
variable y. For each worker Wi, since each {B˜k|k ∈ [M ]\D}
is only evaluated at one point yjk , B˜D should also only be
evaluated at one point, say yi, for protecting the master’s
privacy. If B˜D is evaluated at more than one point while each
of {B˜k|k ∈ [M ]\D} is only evaluated at one point, the worker
Wi will notice that BD is different from the other matrices
{Bk|k ∈ [M ]\D} and suspect that BD is the desired matrix.
After evaluating points for {B˜k}Mk=1 are determined,
each worker Wi encodes the library B into
B˜D(yi) +
∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(yjk). That is, g
D
B,Wi(B) =
B˜D(yi)+
∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(yjk). After encoding B, each worker
Wi computes the function fDWi(g
D
A,Wi(A), g
D
B,Wi(B)) =
{A˜(xWi,p)(B˜D(yi) +
∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(yjk))}Lp=1.
Although the master can request each worker Wi to evaluate
each {B˜k}Mk=1 at only one point, the master can decode each
of the polynomials {Al(B˜D(y) +
∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(yjk))}m−1l=0 ,
whose degree is n − 1, from at least n evaluations, where
n ≥ 2 from (6). Therefore, the master divides the workers
into n equal-sized groups according to the evaluating point for
B˜D. Since the groups are equal-sized, there are N/n workers
in each group. We denote n groups by {Gt}nt=1 and the eval-
uating point for B˜D of each Gt by y = yt, where the points
{yt}nt=1 are randomly chosen and distinct from each other.
That is, each worker Wi in group Gt encodes the library B
into gDB,Wi(B) = B˜D(yt)+
∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(yjk) and computes
a function fDWi(g
D
A,Wi(A), g
D
B,Wi(B)) = {A˜(xWi,p)(B˜D(yt)+∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(yjk))}Lp=1. After m sub-computation results
{A˜(xp)(B˜D(yt) +
∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(yjk))}mp=1 are returned to
the master across the workers in each group Gt, the master can
decode the polynomial A˜(x)(B˜D(yt) +
∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(yjk))
for variable x. After each of n groups returns m sub-
computation results, the master can decode m different
polynomials {Al(B˜D(y) +
∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(yjk))}m−1l=0 for
variable y so that the decoding results are given by
{AlBD,r}(m,n−1)(l,r)=(1,1), from which the whole computation
ABD is recovered.
Let us examine the relation between the parameters. For m
7and L, L ≤ m because L = m implies that the master sends
m evaluations of A˜ to each worker, where the size of each
evaluation is 1/m of whole matrix A. That is, if L = m, the
whole information of A is sent to each worker. If we denote
the communication load for sending whole matrix A from the
master to each worker by |A|, the communication load from
the master to each worker in private polynomial code is given
by Lm |A|.
For m. n, N , and L, in order for the master to decode the
polynomial A˜(x)(B˜D(yt)+
∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(yjk)) from m sub-
computation results returned by Gt, the maximum number of
sub-computation results that can be returned by Gt, which is
given by LNn , should not be smaller than m. We can express
this relation as follows.
L
N
n
≥ m. (7)
C. Privacy proof
In this section, we show that the master’s privacy is pro-
tected in private polynomial codes. In particular, we show
that the privacy constraint for each worker Wi in group Gt
is satisfied, which was given by (1). By chain rule, we can
write the privacy constraint as follows.
I(D;QDi , C
D
i , R
D
i ,B)
= I(D;QDi )
+ I(D;B|QDi )
+ I(D;CDi |QDi ,B)
+ I(D;RDi |QDi ,B, CDi )
Note that RDi = f
D
Wi(g
D
A,Wi(A), g
D
B,Wi(B)) is a deter-
ministic function of CDi = g
D
A,Wi(A) and g
D
B,Wi(B), where
gDB,Wi(B) is a function of B. Since g
D
B,Wi(B) = B˜D(yi) +∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(yjk) and the evaluating points yt and {yjk |k ∈
[M ] \ D} are determined by the the queries QDi , gDB,Wi(B)
is a deterministic function of QDi , which implies that R
D
i
is a deterministic function of CDi , B, and Q
D
i . Therefore,
I(D;RDi |QDi ,B, CDi ) = 0. Since CDi = {A˜(xWi,p)}Lp=1 =
{∑m−1l=0 AlxlW,p}Lp=1, CDi is independent of D. Therefore,
I(D;CDi |QDi ,B) = 0. Since the master determines the index
of the desired matrix D without knowing any information of
the library B, the library B is independent of D, which is
followed by I(D;B|QDi ) = 0.
For the desired matrix BD, the master sends queries QDi to
each worker Wi in Gt in order to request Wi to encode the
library B into B˜D(yt)+
∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(yjk) and compute the
function {A˜(xWi,p)(B˜D(yt)+
∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(yjk))}Lp=1. The
queries QDi are fourfold:
1) QDi,p : queries for partitioning each matrix Bk in the
library B into n− 1 submatrices {Bk,l}n−1l=1
2) QDi,e : queries for evaluating B˜D and {B˜k|k ∈ [M ]\D}
at the points yt and {yjk |k ∈ [M ] \D}, respectively
3) QDi,s : queries for summing the evaluations of {B˜k}Mk=1
into one equation B˜D(yt) +
∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(yjk)
4) QDi,c : queries for computing the function
According to QDi,p, all submatrices {Bk,l}(M,n−1)(k,l)=(1,1) are
elements in Fs×t/(n−1)q . Therefore, QDi,p are independent of
D, which implies I(D;QDi,p) = 0.
According to QDi,e, as assumed in Section III-B, the points
yt and {yjk |k ∈ [M ] \ D} are distinct from each other and
randomly chosen in Fq . Therefore, QDi,e are independent of D,
which implies I(D;QDi,e) = 0.
According to QDi,s, all of the evaluations of {B˜k}Mk=1
are symmetrically summed into one equation B˜D(yt) +∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(yjk). Therefore, Q
D
i,s are independent of D,
which implies I(D;QDi,s) = 0.
According to QDi,c, each of C
D
i = {A˜(xWi,p)}Lp=1 is multi-
plied by B˜D(yt)+
∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(yjk). We already explained
that CDi and B˜D(yt)+
∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(yjk) are independent of
D. Therefore, QDi,c are also independent of D, which implies
I(D;QDi,c) = 0.
As a result, I(D;QDi ) = 0, which implies that
I(D;QDi , C
D
i , R
D
i ,B) = 0. Since the privacy constraint is
satisfied for every worker, the master’s privacy is considered
to be protected in private polynomial codes. 
D. Special cases
In this section, we propose certain special cases of private
polynomial codes, namely, private one-shot polynomial codes
and private asynchronous polynomial codes.
In private one-shot polynomial codes, the master sends only
one evaluation of A˜ to each worker so that each worker returns
only one sub-computation result to the master, which implies
that L = 1. The first example in Section III-A corresponds to
the private one-shot polynomial code.
In private asynchronous polynomial codes, the master di-
vides its own matrix A into much smaller partitions, which
implies that m becomes much larger in turn. The second exam-
ple in Section III-A corresponds to the private asynchronous
polynomial codes, where m = 100. If m is sufficiently
large, even the slow workers can compute and return the
sub-computations with their low computational capabilities,
which results in improved efficiency of coded computation.
As m becomes larger, the lower bound of L also becomes
higher, since L ≥ mnN from (7). As L becomes larger,
faster workers can compute and return more sub-computations
to the master. That is, faster workers are exploited more
efficiently in the private asynchronous polynomial codes as
compared to the private one-shot polynomial codes where the
faster workers are not exploited after returning only one sub-
computation. Therefore, by properly designing the parameters
m and L, all of the workers in each group can continue
working until m sub-computation results are returned. This
implies that asynchronous coded computation is group-wise in
private asynchronous polynomial codes, where the definition
of asynchronous coded computation was given in Section I.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, in terms of the computation time consumed
for receiving K sub-computation results across N workers
and communication load from the master to N workers, we
8compare the private one-shot polynomial codes and private
asynchronous polynomial codes with the conventional private
information retrieval (PIR) scheme. We benchmark the optimal
RPIR scheme in [8], where the number of unresponsive nodes
corresponds to the stragglers. For fair comparison, we assume
that the workers do not collude with each other in RPIR
scheme, which is the same as in private polynomial codes.
The RPIR scheme in [8] is directly applicable to the coded
computation. The master encodes the library B = {Bk}Mk=1
into {B˜k}Mk=1 with MDS code and each B˜k is multiplied by
A. That is, the master should transmit all of matrix A to
each worker. Encoding A does not affect the computation time
and the communication load since every encoded matrix A˜
should be multiplied across the workers to exploit the encoded
undesired matrices {B˜k|k ∈ [M ] \D} as side information.
A. Computation time
For computation time, we assume that the computation time
distribution of each worker is independent of each other and
follows the exponential distribution as in [1]. That is, if we
denote the computation time of a single worker by random
variable T0, the following holds.
Pr(T0 ≤ t) = 1− e−µ(t−γ),∀t ≥ γ,
where the parameters γ and µ denotes the shift parameter and
straggling parameter, respectively.
When computing ABD without considering the master’s
privacy as in [1], the computation time is that of the Kth fastest
worker for computing 1/K of whole computation. Therefore,
the computation time is the expected value of the Kth statistic
of N independent exponential random variables. If we denote
a sum
∑N
n=1
1
n by HN , HN ' logN for large N . Since
the expected value of the Kth statistic of N independent
exponential random variable is given by HN−HN−Kµ , the
computation time of the conventional coded computation is
given by
tconv =
1
K
(γ +
1
µ
log
N
N −K ).
Similar to the conventional coded computation in [1], in
the RPIR scheme, the computation of stragglers is ignored
and the computation time is determined by the Kth fastest
worker. In order to recover ABD under the privacy constraint,
the RPIR scheme requires 1 + 1K + · · · + 1KM−1 times
more computation than that required by directly computing
ABD without considering the master’s privacy. Therefore, the
computation time of the RPIR scheme denoted by tRPIR takes
(1+ 1K + · · ·+ 1KM−1 ) times longer than tconv , which is given
by
tRPIR = (
1
K
+ · · ·+ 1
KM
)(γ +
1
µ
log
N
N −K ). (8)
As explained in Section III-B, K = mn in private polyno-
mial codes, while A and each of {Bk}Mk=1 are divided into
m and n − 1 submatrices, respectively. That is, the sizes of
A˜ and encoded B are 1m of A and
1
n−1 of each {Bk}Mk=1,
respectively. Therefore, the computational complexity for each
sub-computation is 1m(n−1) of the computational complexity
for directly computing ABD without considering the master’s
privacy.
In order to derive the computation time in the private one-
shot polynomial codes and the private asynchronous polyno-
mial codes, we order the workers from the fastest worker
to the slowest worker. That is, worker Wi is the ith fastest
worker among the N workers. As explained in Section III-B,
the computation time of private polynomial codes equals the
computation time of the slowest group. We denote the slowest
group by Gs where s ∈ [n]. If we denote the workers in Gs
by {Wsi}N/ni=1 , worker Wsi is the sith fastest worker among
all workers {Wi}Ni=1 and we assume s1 < s2 < · · · < sN/n.
Therefore, the computation time of private one-shot polyno-
mial codes equals the computation time for the worker Wsm
to compute its sub-computation, which is given by
tone =
1
m(n− 1)(γ +
1
µ
log
N
N − sm ). (9)
Since there are N !((N/n)!)n
1
n! combinations for grouping N
workers into n groups, we average tone over all of the
combinations so as to obtain average computation time ta,one.
We denote the set of combinations by {Ti}
N!
((N/n)!)n
1
n!
i=1 and tone
for Ti by tone,i, so that ta,one is given by
ta,one =
∑ N!
((N/n)!)n
1
n!
i=1 tone,i
N !
((N/n)!)n
1
n!
. (10)
For the private asynchronous polynomial codes, since every
worker in the slowest group Gs continues working during the
computation time tasync, the following holds.
tasync = Ps1(γ +
1
µ
log
N
N − s1 )
= Ps2(γ +
1
µ
log
N
N − s2 )
...
= PsN/n(γ +
1
µ
N
N − sN/n ),
where Psi denotes the normalized amount of sub-computations
returned by Wsi in Gs during tasync.
Since
∑N/n
i=1 Psi = tasync(
∑N/n
i=1 (γ +
1
µ log
N
N−si )
−1) =
1
n−1 , tasync is given by
tasync =
1/(n− 1)∑N/n
i=1
1
γ+ 1µ log
N
N−si
. (11)
As with private one-shot polynomial code, we average
tasync over all combinations of grouping so as to obtain
average computation time ta,async. If we denote tasync for
given combination Ti by tasync,i, ta,async is given by
ta,async =
∑ N!
((N/n)!)n
1
n!
i=1 tasync,i
N !
((N/n)!)n
1
n!
. (12)
We compare the computation time between three schemes
for N = 12, M = 4, and γ = µ = 0.1. For the private
9Fig. 2. The computation time comparison between the RPIR scheme, private
one-shot polynomial code and private asynchronous polynomial code for N =
12, M = 4, µ = γ = 0.1, and varying K.
one-shot polynomial codes and the private asynchronous poly-
nomial codes, we set n = 2. Since K = mn in the private
polynomial codes, we set K as even number and vary K from
2 to 10. That is, m is varying from 1 to 5 in the private one-shot
polynomial codes. Note that ta,async is independent of m from
(12). The comparison result for computation time is given in
Fig. 2. The computation time of private one-shot polynomial
cod is strictly larger than that of the RPIR scheme. The
computation time of private asynchronous polynomial codes is
given by 1.5861, where the private asynchronous polynomial
codes achieve at least 60% and 20% reduction in computation
time for given parameters, compared to the private one-shot
polynomial codes and RPIR scheme, respectively.
The shift parameter γ and straggling parameter µ also affect
the computation time. In order to identify the effects of the
two parameters, we compare the computation times between
the three schemes for varying µ from 10−1 to 10 and γ =
1. For N = 12, M = 4, we set K = 4 and n = 2. The
comparison result is given in Fig. 3. The private asynchronous
polynomial code outperforms the other schemes, although the
gap is diminished as µ increases. This is reasonable because
small µ indicates that the delaying effect by the slow workers
is significant, where the delaying effect is alleviated in private
asynchronous polynomial codes, since the computation of slow
workers is not ignored. As µ becomes larger, the delaying
effect of slow workers becomes negligible, thus implying that
the advantage of private asynchronous polynomial code also
becomes negligible. Although the performance gap is reduced
as µ increases, the private one-shot polynomial code is always
the worst in the entire range.
B. Communication load
Let us characterize the communication load of each scheme.
We only consider the communication load from the master to
the workers. In private polynomial codes, the communication
load from the workers to the master is identical regardless
Fig. 3. The computation time comparison between the RPIR scheme, private
one-shot polynomial code and private asynchronous polynomial code for N =
12, M = 4, K = 4, γ = 1, and varying µ from 10−1 to 10.
of the parameter m or L. Note that each sub-computation
in the private polynomial codes is an element in F
r
m× t(n−1)
q ,
whereas mn sub-computations are returned to the master, thus
implying that the communication load for returning mn sub-
computations only depends on n. Therefore, for given n, the
communication loads of private one-shot polynomial codes
and private asynchronous polynomial codes are identical.
Therefore, we compare only communication load from the
master to the workers.
We assume that the master simultaneously transmits its own
data to every worker. Since all of A should be transmitted to
every worker in the RPIR scheme, the communication load is
N |A|. In private one-shot polynomial codes, the size of A˜ is
|A|/m and one evaluation of A˜ is delivered to each worker,
which implies that L = 1. Therefore, the communication load
of the private one-shot polynomial codes is Nm |A|. From (7), m
is upper bounded by N/n in the private one-shot polynomial
code. Therefore, whereas ta,one was strictly larger than tRPIR,
the communication load of the RPIR scheme is at most N/n
times larger than that of the private one-shot polynomial codes.
Since the master sends L evaluations of A˜ to each worker
in private asynchronous polynomial codes, the communication
load in private asynchronous polynomial code is given by
NL
m |A|. In order to cover the extreme case in which the fastest
worker in a group solely returns all of m sub-computations
before the other workers return any sub-computation, we
set L = m, which is the same as in the second example
in Section III-A. In this case, the communication load of
private asynchronous polynomial codes becomes N |A|, which
is the same as that of the RPIR scheme. However, for many
practical scenarios, L can be significantly lowered in private
asynchronous polynomial codes, thus implying that the gap of
communication load between the private one-shot polynomial
codes and the private asynchronous polynomial codes can be
reduced.
Note that if we minimize the communication load of private
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one-shot polynomial codes by maximizing m, the computation
time of private one-shot polynomial codes in (9) is maximized
since K is fixed to mn. That is, there is a trade-off between
computation time and communication load in private one-shot
polynomial codes.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced private coded computation as a
variation of coded computation that protects the master’s pri-
vacy. As an achievable scheme for private coded computation,
we proposed private polynomial codes based on conventional
polynomial codes in coded computation. As special cases of
private polynomial codes, we characterized private one-shot
polynomial codes and private asynchronous polynomial codes.
While the private asynchronous polynomial codes achieved
faster computation time, the private one-shot polynomial codes
achieved smaller communication load. We compared the two
special private polynomial codes with the conventional RPIR
scheme and verified that the proposed schemes outperform the
conventional scheme either in terms of computation time or
communication load. In future work, we may use different
codes in order to improve the performance. For example,
entangled polynomial codes [9], a generalized version of
polynomial codes, can be applied to private polynomial codes.
REFERENCES
[1] K. Lee, M. Lam, R. Pedarsani, D. Papailiopoulos, and K. Ramchandran,
“Speeding up distributed machine learning using codes,” IEEE Trans.
Inf. Theory., vol. 64, no. 3, pp. 1514-1529, Mar. 2018.
[2] S. Li, M. A. Maddah-Ali, Q. Yu, and A. S. Avestimehr, “A fundamental
tradeoff between computation and communication in distributed com-
puting,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 64, no. 1, pp. 109-128, Jan. 2018.
[3] R. Tandon, Q. Lei, A. G. Dimakis, and N. Karampatziakis, “Gradient
coding: Avoiding stragglers in distributed learning,” in ICML, 2017, pp.
3368-3376.
[4] S. Dutta, V. Cadambe, and P. Grover, “Coded convolution for parallel
and distributed computing within a deadline,” in Proc. IEEE ISIT, June
2017, pp. 2403-2407.
[5] Q. Yu, M. Maddah-Ali, and S. Avestimehr, “Polynomial codes: An
optimal design for high-dimensional coded matrix multiplication,” in
Proc. NIPS, Dec. 2017, pp. 4406-4416.
[6] S. Kiani, N. Ferdinand and S. C. Draper, “Exploitation of Stragglers in
Coded Computation,” in arXiv preprint arXiv:1806.10253, 2018.
[7] B. Chor, E. Kushilevitz, O. Goldreich, and M. Sudan, “Private informa-
tion retrieval,” Journal of the ACM, 45(6):965-981, 1998.
[8] H. Sun and S. A. Jafar, ”The Capacity of Robust Private Information
Retrieval with Colluding Databases,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1606.08828,
2016.
[9] Q. Yu, M. A. Maddah-Ali, and A. S. Avestimehr, “Straggler mitigation
in distributed matrix multiplication: Fundamental limits and optimal
coding,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.07487., 2018.
Minchul Kim (S’17) received the B.S. degree in
Electrical and Computer Engineering from Seoul
National University, South Korea in 2014. He is
currently working towards the Ph.D. degree with the
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering,
Seoul National University, South Korea. His research
interests include distributed computing, private in-
formation retrieval, and codes for distributed storage
systems.
Heecheol Yang (S’15) received the B.S. degree in
Electrical and Computer Engineering from Seoul
National University, South Korea in 2013. He is
currently working towards the Ph.D. degree with the
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineer-
ing, Seoul National University, South Korea. His
research interests include interference management
techniques for wireless communications, network
information theory, and security for data storage
systems. He received the Bronze prize in the 23rd
Samsung Humantech Paper Contest.
Jungwoo Lee (S’88, M’94, SM’07) received the
B.S. degree in Electronics Engineering from Seoul
National University, Seoul, Korea in 1988 and the
M.S.E. degree and the Ph.D. degree in Electrical
Engineering from Princeton University in 1990 and
1994.
He is now a professor at the department of elec-
trical and computer engineering of Seoul National
University. He was a member of technical staff
working on multimedia signal processing at SRI
(Sarnoff) from 1994 to 1999, where he was a team
leader (PI) for an $18M NIST ATP program. He has been with Wireless
Advanced Technology Lab of Lucent Technologies Bell Labs since 1999,
and worked on W-CDMA base station algorithm development as a team
leader, for which he received two Bell Labs technical achievement awards.
His research interests include wireless communications, information theory,
distributed storage, and machine learning. He holds 21 U.S. patents. He is
an editor for IEEE wireless communications letters (WCL) since 2017. He
was an associate editor for IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology (2008
to 2011) and Journal of Communications and Networks (JCN, 2012-2016).
He has also been a chief editor for KICS journal, and an executive editor
for Elsevier-KICS ICT Express since 2015. He has also been a Track chair
for IEEE ICC SPC (2016-2017), and was a TPC/OC member for ICC15,
ITW15, VTC15s, ISIT09, PIMRC08, ICC05, and ISITA05. He received the
Qualcomm Dr. Irwin Jacobs award in 2014 for his contributions in wireless
communications.
